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Abstract  
This article is the second step in our research into the Symbol Grounding Problem 
(SGP). In a previous work, we defined the main condition that must be satisfied by any 
strategy in order to provide a valid solution to the SGP, namely the zero semantic 
commitment condition (Z condition). We then showed that all the main strategies 
proposed so far fail to satisfy the Z condition, although they provide several important 
lessons to be followed by any new proposal. Here, we develop a new solution of the 
SGP. It is called praxical in order to stress the key role played by the interactions 
between the agents and their environment. It is based on a new theory of meaning –
Action-based Semantics (AbS) – and on a new kind of artificial agents, called two-
machine artificial agents (AM²). Thanks to their architecture, AM2s implement AbS, 
and this allows them to ground their symbols semantically and to develop some fairly 
advanced semantic abilities, including the development of semantically grounded 
communication and the elaboration of representations, while still respecting the Z 
condition. 
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1. Introduction: the Symbol Grounding Problem, its Nature and Constraints 
The Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) (Harnad, 1990) is one of the crucial questions in 
the philosophy of information (Floridi, 2004). It concerns the difficulty of specifying 
how an artificial agent (AA) can autonomously elaborate its own semantics for the 
symbols that it manipulates, by interacting with its environment and other agents. As 
Harnad puts it: ‘How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be 
made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? 
How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the 
basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless 
symbols?’ (Harnad (1990), p. 335).  
In (Taddeo and Floridi, 2005), we analysed the SGP and assessed the main 
strategies developed in the last fifteen years in order to solve it. That research was 
meant to lay the foundation for this article, which introduces a new solution to the SGP. 
We shall therefore begin by briefly summarising the main conclusions reached in our 
previous work, to which the interested reader is referred for further details. 
The requirement to be satisfied by any strategy seeking to solve the SGP is the 
zero semantic commitment condition (henceforth Z condition). According to the Z 
condition, no valid solution of the SGP can rely on forms of 
a) innatism, since no semantic resources (some virtus semantica) should be 
presupposed as already pre-installed in the AA; and  
b) externalism, since no semantic resources should be uploaded from the “outside” 
by some deus ex machina that is already semantically-proficient.  
Of course, a valid solution draws on an AA’s own capacities and resources (e.g. 
computational, syntactical, procedural, perceptual, educational resources, exploited 
through algorithms, sensors, actuators etc.) to ground its symbols. However, these 
should not already be semantic, as that would be begging the question.  
Points (a) and (b) also clarify the sense in which a valid solution of the SGP must 
be fully naturalised, despite the fact that we are talking about artificial agents: no 
supernatural or extra-natural strategies are allowed.  
Any approach that breaches the Z condition is semantically committed and fails to 
provide a valid solution to the SGP.  
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All the eight strategies analysed in (Taddeo and Floridi, 2005) seek to ground the 
symbols through the sensorimotor capacities of the AAs involved. They differ in the 
methods used to elaborate the data obtained from the sensorimotor experiences, and in 
the role (if any) assigned to the elaboration of the data representations in the process of 
generating the semantics for the symbols. However, they all turn out to be semantically 
committed, so none of them can be said to provide a valid solution to the SGP in the 
sense specified above. The most difficult issue is represented by the semantic capacity 
to generate representations. For it cannot be presupposed without begging the question, 
but abandoning any reference to representations means accepting a dramatic limit to 
what any AA may be able to achieve semantically, since the development of even the 
simplest abstract categories becomes impossible. 
From the analysis of the eight strategies, we concluded that a valid solution of the 
SGP will need to combine at least the following features:  
 1. a bottom-up, sensorimotor approach to the SGP;  
 2. a top-down feedback approach that allows the harmonization of top-level 
grounded symbols and bottom-level, sensorimotor interactions with the 
environment;  
 3. the availability of some sort of representational capacities in the AA;  
 4. the availability of some sort of categorical/abstracting capacities in the AA;  
 5. the availability of some sort of communication capacities among AAs in order 
to ground the symbols diachronically and avoid the Wittgensteinian problem of 
a “private language”;  
 6. an evolutionary approach in the development of (1)-(5);  
7. the satisfaction of the Z condition in the development of (1)-(6). 
This was the recommendation made at the end of our previous research (Taddeo and 
Floridi, 2005). In this paper, we propose a solution for the SGP that respects the Z 
condition and also satisfies the requirements listed above. For reasons that will soon 
become clear, we shall refer to it as the praxical1 solution. We shall introduce it in two 
steps.  
The first step, taken in § 2, consists in outlining the appropriate approach 
involved in the process of generating new meanings. This is defined as Action-based 
Semantics (AbS). AbS requires an explanation of the specific process that allows the 
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coupling of symbols to meanings. Such coupling is more intuitively introduced by 
referring to an actual agent implementing AbS, so we shall postpone its theoretical 
description until § 3.  
The second step, taken in § 3, consists in describing a two-machine AA (AM²) 
that implements the AbS. An AM² assigns meanings to symbols without elaborating any 
kind of categorical representation yet. We shall see that it does not presuppose semantic 
resources or capacities in order to generate its semantics, and hence that it satisfies the Z 
condition. We shall also describe the second stage of the semantic process, namely how 
an AM² generates representations. These are neither categorical nor conceptual, unlike 
Harnad’s, and yet it will be shown that they allow the development of a semantics in 
which symbols may be names of classes of meanings. Such semantics avoids both the 
constraints highlighted in (Taddeo and Floridi, 2005) for the semantics generated by the 
non-representationalist strategy (Brooks, 1990; Varshavskaya, 2002), and the criticism 
levelled at the representationalist solutions (Harnad, 1990). In § 3.1, we shall consider 
three objections to the process performed by an AM². In § 3.2, we shall refer to a 
specific learning rule and to an evolutionary scenario in order to show how a population 
of AM²s could develop its semantic abilities autonomously.  
In § 4, we shall describe how a population of AM²s can develop more complex 
semantics abilities, such as semantically grounded communication and a shared 
semantics.  
In the conclusion, we shall briefly summarise the work done and discuss an 
interesting consequence of the praxical solution of the SGP, namely the possibility of 
developing a theory of meaning based on it. Its development, however, lies beyond the 
scope of this paper and will be left to a third and last stage in our research.  
 
2. Action-based Semantics  
The basic idea of an action-based semantics is simple: in the beginning, the meanings of 
the symbols generated by an AA are the internal states of that AA, which in turn are 
directly correlated to the actions performed by the same AA.  
Consider a common AA, such as a robot able to move in a laboratory. Let us call 
it FOTOC.2 We shall describe and discuss FOTOC in the next section in more depth, but 
here suffice to say that any time FOTOC executes a movement, such as ‘turning left’, it 
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enters into a specific internal state and should be able to take advantage of this internal 
state as a meaning to be associated to a symbol. So, by saying that the performed 
actions are the meanings of the symbols, we mean that the AA relates its symbols to the 
states in which it is placed by the actions that it performs, and that symbols are 
considered the names of the actions via the corresponding internal states. 
The advantage of this approach is that the very first step in the generation of 
meanings is not in itself a semantic process, but rather an immediate consequence of an 
AA’s performance. Through AbS, an AA can generate meanings without its perceptual 
data (e.g. FOTOC’s detection of its location in the lab office) causing some kind of 
representations, a process that is always based on semantic criteria and therefore cannot 
but breach the Z condition. The internal states of the AA are excellent candidates for the 
role of non-semantic yet semantic-inducing resources.  
By following the AbS, one avoids the use of any kind of external assistance (e.g. 
a programmer or a trainer) while also avoiding extrinsic biases: the initial generation of 
meanings is teleologically free, i.e. it is neutral with respect to any purpose. Admittedly, 
most of the time, an AA performs an action in order to achieve some goal, but this form 
of teleological behaviour is not what is involved in the AbS. AbS assumes that the 
action performed − not the goal to be achieved − by an AA is going to ground its 
symbols semantically. In our example, FOTOC is supposed to ground a symbol to its 
internal state, induced by its action of turning left, and not by its command or goal 
‘avoid this obstacle’ or ‘catch that object’ or ‘turn left’. This is both plausible and easily 
achievable. The development of an AA’s goal-oriented behaviour may be the result of 
the evolution of bio-chemical mechanisms that require no semantic resources at all. The 
heliotropic behaviour of plants, such as snow buttercups or sunflowers, is a canonical 
example.3 Note that, even if an AA performs some action randomly − without any 
function or goal − or incorrectly, AbS still identifies that action as the source of the state 
that then provides the meaning of the related symbol.  
To summarise, at this stage, the purpose of the action has no direct influence in 
the generation of the meaning. Hence, in AbS there are no extrinsic semantic criteria 
driving the process of meaning generation. This initial stage of the process is free of any 
semantic commitment, and thus satisfies the Z condition.  
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In the next section, we shall see how the general idea of an AbS may be 
implemented by an AA. We shall then consider the importance of evolutionary 
processes in the development of semantic capacities. Here, in order to clarify the AbS 
further, it is worth disposing of a potential misunderstanding. It concerns the similarities 
between AbS and the “meaning as use” semantics associated with the later 
Wittgenstein.  
According to that semantic theory, a language is a form of social interaction. The 
meanings of the symbols follow from the uses of the language in given contexts, and 
from negotiations, stipulations and agreements among the speakers. Meanings are 
therefore partly conventionally defined in a community of speakers, partly identified 
with the speakers’ intentions to perform some actions, given some symbols. All this 
qualifies Wittgenstein’s linguistic games, pragmatically speaking, as teleological. Recall 
that, according to Wittgenstein, the meaning of the word ‘slab’ must be referred to its 
function within the linguistic game in which the word is used. A bricklayer says ‘slab’ 
in order to interact with his co-worker and cause him to have a specific reaction: the one 
which involves giving him the slab. Then, it seems that the meaning of ‘slab’ is the 
action that the co-worker executes in association with the word ‘slab’.  
All this may seem to be very similar, or perhaps outright identical, to a version 
of the AbS theory. The problem highlighted by this criticism is that, if AbS is indeed a 
semantics of use à la Wittgenstein, it follows that meanings really arise from social 
interactions among speakers, i.e. agents already belonging to a community that shares 
means of communication, and from a kind of practical finalism. However, these are all 
features that represent external criteria, and hence presuppose some pre-established 
semantic abilities on behalf of the agents involved. If such a family resemblance 
between AbS and Wittgensteinian linguistic games were correct, it would be very hard 
to see how one could deny that AbS breaches the Z condition.  
The criticism can be answered by explicating three main differences between 
AbS and the “meaning as use” semantics, which significantly differentiate the former 
from the latter and hence defuse the objection. 
First, in the semantics of linguistic games, meaning is not the performed action. 
The meaning of ‘slab’ is defined through the linguistic game shared by the bricklayer 
and his co-worker, and the meaning is the way in which a symbol is to be used in order 
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to trigger a particular reaction by the other player within the linguistic game. But in AbS 
the meaning of ‘slab’ is the internal state of the agent, a state triggered by the 
corresponding action. At this stage, no semantic interaction with other agents is yet in 
view. 
Second, in a semantics based on “meaning as use”, the association between 
meanings and symbols is conventional and contextual. It is based on negotiation and 
agreement among the speakers, requires training and is regulated by degrees of success. 
By contrast, according to AbS, the initial association of symbols and meanings is a 
direct input-output relation that follows only from the performance of actions. As we 
shall see in the following section, an individual agent associates a meaning with a 
symbol through the performance of an action, without considering the frame in which it 
has performed that action and, crucially, without taking into account the association 
performed by other AAs. The social component arises only after the association has 
taken place. To put it differently: according to AbS, semantics has its initial roots in the 
individual agent’s behaviours, not in the community, and this is an advantage since, 
speaking in terms of logical order, the virtuous dialectic of interactions between a 
community of semantically-proficient agents and its members begins with the 
availability of individual agents capable of grounding their symbols, at least in principle 
and no matter how minimally and in some overridable way. 
Third, to define meaning as a function of the use of the corresponding symbol 
entails a kind of finalism, which we have seen is not part of the AbS theory. AbS is 
therefore not a convention-based theory of meaning and does not entail, as a starting 
point, any kind of teleological theory of goal-oriented behaviour. This is what allows 
one to consider AbS free of any semantic commitment, unlike Wittgensteinian linguistic 
games, which clearly do not satisfy the Z condition. 
 The time has come to consider the AbS in more detail. 
 
3. Two–Machine Artificial Agents and their AbS 
In this section, we shall describe a kind of AA capable of implementing AbS. We have 
already referred to such an AA as a two-machine artificial agent, or simply AM². We 
shall argue that AM²s can solve the SGP while satisfying the Z condition.  
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There are two main difficulties that must be overcome in order to show that an 
AM² solves the SGP correctly: 
i) it must be able to associate symbols to the actions that it performs; without 
ii) helping itself to any semantic resource in associating actions and symbols. 
The architecture of an AM² explains how it can achieve (i) while avoiding (ii). 
This is based on features of the so-called reflective architecture, in particular on the 
availability of upward-reflection processes. Such an architecture is well-documented in 
(Barklund et al., 2000; Brazier et al., 1999; Cointe, 1999) and the interested reader may 
wish to consult those works for a more in-depth description.  
Essentially, the upward reflection is part of the metaprogramming architecture. 
A system capable of metaprogramming operates at two levels, which interact with each 
other. It organizes actions at an object level (OL), where it interacts with the external 
environment. But it can also take actions on its internal states and on its own 
elaborations. In this case, it operates at a meta-level (ML), which takes as data the 
actions at the OL. The relevant metaprograms are the reflection processes, where these 
function as upward reflection. In these metaprograms, the OL computation enables the 
ML computation. The modifications performed at the ML are effective and have a 
corresponding impact on the OL computation. The utility of reflection shows that the 
whole system [OL + ML] not only interacts with itself but is also properly affected by 
the results of such interactions. 
The kind of AA we are discussing here is constituted by two machines – M1 and 
M2 – which interact with each other and perform actions on two levels. M1 operates at 
OL, interacting directly with the external environment (e.g. by navigating, detecting 
obstacles, avoiding them etc.), thus outputting and inputting actions. M2 operates at ML 
and the target of its elaborations is the internal states of M1. Any action that M1 outputs 
to, or inputs from the environment defines a particular internal state (Sn) of M1. So 
actions and internal states are causally coupled: for any different action in M1 there is a 
different internal state Sn and for all similar actions in M1 there is the same Sn. Two 
points need to be clarified before proceeding further: continuity and similarity.  
Clearly, the agent’s actions/states are not necessarily organised into a discrete 
flow, but may be subject to analogue/continuous variations. For instance, FOTOC may 
seamlessly move from action a to action b, and hence from the corresponding internal 
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state Sn to another internal state Sn+1. All the same, here we shall disregard details about 
how this flow may be broken into a set of discrete elements. What is crucial is that, as in 
a continuous tape, cutting the flow means cutting both sides, as it were, with the action 
on the one hand and the corresponding internal state on the other; and that the same 
types of agents may be reasonably assumed to have similar types of internal states 
triggered by similar types of actions and to “cut” their tapes in equally similar ways. 
This assumption of “physiological or hardware-related similarity” does not breach the Z 
condition, since it refers to hard (structural and/or physical) similarities among agents, 
not to similarities assumed by the agents at a soft (semantic) level. Again, one may 
compare it to the similarity occurring in the behaviour and environmental interactions 
showed by a field of sun-flowers. 
To highlight the connection between M1’s actions and states, we represent (see 
Figure 1) the internal states of M1 as the results of a function (f) of interactions (e) 
between the machine (Machine 1) and the environment (E), so that Sn = f(e). 
 
Output S1 = f (e)
S1
E
LoA1
e
Machine 1
 
Figure 1. The structure of Machine 1: E is the environment, S1 is the internal state of Machine 1, LoA1 is 
the level of abstraction at which Machine 1 interacts with E. f (e) is the function which identifies S1, 
where (e) is a given interaction between the agent and the environment. 
 
Let us see now how the actions performed by an AM² may ground its symbols. 
Imagine an AM² positioned in an environment such a laboratory. In the previous 
section, we called this agent FOTOC. FOTOC is able to interact with the environment, it 
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performs some actions, e.g., it moves around the laboratory office changing direction – 
and it has some perceptions. In particular, it is provided with a light-sensor on each of 
its sides, thus enabling it to detect the dark and light zones in the laboratory. When 
FOTOC detects a dark place, its M1 is in a specific internal state, say Sdark. Likewise, 
when FOTOC detects a light place, its M1 internal state is in Slight. For any dark place 
(for present purposes, the intensity of the darkness is irrelevant), FOTOC’s M1 has the 
same (i.e. indistinguishable) internal state Sdark. That is why it does not need congruent 
perceptions of the environment to elaborate an internal state.  
We use the theory of levels of abstraction4 (LoA) (Floridi et al., 2004) to 
describe the degree of refinement of M1’s perceptions. M1 accesses the environment at 
a LoA that allows only a specific granularity of detection of its features. Thus, through 
M1’s perception, FOTOC can only obtain approximate (to whatever degree of granularity 
is implemented) data about its external environment. Note that such description makes 
full sense only from an external perspective, namely ours, where the LoAs are much 
more informative. For FOTOC, given its LoA, the world is just a sequence of dark and 
light loci with a hardwired LoA, i.e. with a specific granularity of details. The same 
holds true for the actions performed by an AM² embedded within an environment. 
Suppose FOTOC is able to move around the laboratory in such a way that it can turn 30° 
or 15° to the left. For both these actions, the M1 of FOTOC may have the same internal 
state, Sleft if its LoA does not allow any discrimination between angles, but only the 
detection of a left turn. This feature follows from an AM²’s structure. LoAs are related 
to the interactions between AM²s and the environment and to the features of the two 
machines M1 and M2 in the sense that they are hardwired in AM²s, that is, they are 
structurally dependent on the physical implementation (embodiment) of the AAs and of 
their interactions with their environment.5 
Following the metaprogramming architecture, M1 communicates with the other 
machine, M2. M1 sends its (uninterpreted) internal state to M2 (see Figure 2 below). 
M2 is a symbol maker and retainer. It is constituted by a symbol source, a memory 
space, and a symbol set. The two machines communicate their data at their respective 
LoAs. M2 reads the states from M1 according to its LoA (LoA2), which is less refined 
then M1’s LoA.. Because of LoA2’s granularity, M2 does not read Sn as it has been sent 
by M1; instead, Sn  is modified by the LoA2 in such a way that the new state is more 
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generic. In other words, M1’s internal state is transduced into a new state at LoA2. For 
example, suppose the state sent to M2 is related to the action ‘turn left by 32°’, the state 
read by M2 according to its LoA is a more generic ‘turn left’. The new state can be 
considerate the result of a function as LoA2 (Sn) = Sn2, where Sn2 is a less specified state 
then Sn.  
The transduction process is affected by M2’s LoA. It is not defined by extrinsic 
criteria and it is not learned by the AM². Rather it follows directly from the AM²’s 
structure and its specific embodiment. Like bacteria, an AM² may be assumed to have 
developed the transduction processes by evolution.6 Bacteria, cells and unicellular 
organisms perform transduction processes in order to interact with the external 
environment and exchange information with it. During such processes the molecular 
structure of the signal is converted in such a way that it can be perceived by the receptor 
of the signal, so that the receptor can read the signal and modify its behaviour. 
Once the new state is obtained, M2 associates the transduced state with a symbol 
removed from the symbol set. The process of removing a symbol from the set and 
coupling it with a state is discrete, non-recursive, arbitrary but not random, in the 
following sense. M2 makes explicit just one symbol for each input it receives; and 
cannot remove the same symbol more than once. The choice of the symbol is arbitrary, 
since it is semantically unrelated to the transduced states, but it is not random, because 
similar types of agents will associate similar symbols with similar transduced states. 
Still, symbols and transduced states are different kinds of data: they are associated – 
coupled together – but not transduced one into another. 
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S1: input from M1
Output: association = (S1, Sym1)
Machine 2
E
LoA2
Symbols 
Set: Sym1, Sym2, 
Symn.
Memory:
records the 
associations
(S1, Sym1)
 
Figure 2. The structure of Machine 2 (M2). E is the environment, M2 does not act on the environment but 
on M1; the environment acts on M2 indirectly, through the evolutionary process. Sym1 is the symbol 
elaborated by Machine 2. LoA2 is the level of abstraction at which Machine 2 interacts with E. (S1, Sym1) 
is the ensuing association between a symbol and an internal state of Machine 1, the output of M2’s 
elaboration. 
 
Once a symbol has been chosen, M2 applies a storing rule and a performing rule. The 
storing rule records the symbol and the related state in the memory space. The 
performing rule regulates the communications between M1 and M2 and concerns the 
association between a symbol and a state. Following the performing rule, each time M2 
receives an input from M1 it initially verifies whether the input received, or any another 
similar (i.e. indistinguishable by M2 at its LoA) input has already been elaborated. If 
M2 does not locate an input similar to the input stored in its memory, then it continues 
the process described above. Otherwise (if M2 finds the input, or an indistinguishable 
one, in its memory) it does not produce a new symbol, but reproduces the association 
already founded in its memory.  
The association process is coherent: by following the performing rule, M2 
obtains the same association any time it receives the same kind of input from M1, thus 
nomically associating different symbols to different internal states of M1. Any symbol 
elaborated by M2 is related through the internal state of M1 to a cluster of actions, i.e., 
all those actions not distinguished as different by the hardwired LoA. M2’s symbols are 
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now grounded in the actions through the corresponding internal states of M1. The 
resulting symbol is the outcome of a function, namely Sym1 = g (Sn). And since Sn is 
also the result of a function f (e), the symbols selected by M2 are actually the result of a 
function of a function, Sym1 = g (f (e)), see Figure 3.  
 
S1
LoA2
LoA1
E
Symbols
Source
Memory:records 
the associations 
(S1, Sym1)
M2’s output = g(f(e))
Machine 1
Machine 2
 
Figure 3. Two-machine artificial agents’ architecture. A two-machine artificial agent inputs/outputs some 
action/perception (e) from/on the environment E. E interacts with Machine 1 (M1) and acts on Machine 2 
(M2) modifying it according to the evolutionary process. Any action is related to a corresponding internal 
state (S1) of M1 at a specific level of abstraction, LoA1. M 1 communicates its internal states to M2. M1’s 
internal state is transduced into an input for M2, which associates the input with a symbol (Sym1). M2 
stores the state and the relate symbol in its memory. For any other input, M2 follows the procedure 
defined by the performing rule. Each symbol selected by M2 is a function (g) of the internal state, S1. 
Since also Sn is the result of a function – f(e) – a M2’s output is a function of a function, g(f(e)). 
 
As we have shown above, M2’s performances are also characterized by a specific LoA. 
In particular, the LoA of M2 is less refined than the LoA of M1. In our example, 
FOTOC’s M2 may distinguish between M1’s state Sleft, related to the action ‘turn left’, 
and M1’s state Smaintain, related to the action ‘maintain this direction’, but it may not 
draw any distinction between M1’s state Sleft and M1’s state Sright related to the action 
‘turn right’. In short, by “abstracting in hardwired fashion”, an AA ends up associating a 
single symbol with a cluster of similar actions. In the vocabulary of data compression, 
one may say that the process of transduction is lossy or never perfectly efficient. At this 
point, it is also important to stress that the whole process is formulated in such a way as 
to make it intuitive to us, external observers, but that, in order to satisfy the Z condition, 
no assumption should be made in terms of a “proper” way of abstracting that might 
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result in some magic overlap between an AA’s abstractions and ours. To use a previous 
example, heliotropism is a response to blue light, so if the plant is covered with a red 
transparent filter at night, blue light is blocked and the plant does not turn towards the 
sun, whereas a blue filter does not affect its behaviour. Now the filters are the physical 
implementations of the LoAs at which the plant interacts with its environment. So an 
external observer may simplify by saying that the plant abstracts the colour blue from 
light in hardwired fashion, in order to operate successfully in its environment. This is 
fine as long as it is not taken literally. In our example, FOTOC abstracts in ways that we 
shall see are merely determined by its evolution and survival as an agent.  
From the fact that M2’s LoA is less refined than M1’s, it follows that M2 does not 
have a finely-grained perception of M1’s internal states and may be unable to 
distinguish between M1’s similar internal states. M2 will generate the same symbol to 
name all the actions which allow e.g. FOTOC to change the direction of movement. We 
call these symbols general symbols. To M2, the meaning of such a symbol is a general 
meaning, which arises from a generalization of similar meanings; in our example, for 
FOTOC’s M2, the general meaning would be ‘turning’.  
An AM² does not have to rely on some semantic criterion in order to collect similar 
meanings in the first place and then elaborate the general one. Rather, we have seen 
above that a general meaning arises from a class of similar meanings elaborated by M2 
according to its LoA. In its elaboration, M2 considers only the syntactical features of 
M1’s internal states, not their meanings, i.e., the actions they refer to. So here too there 
is no semantic commitment in defining the class of meanings, which is elaborated 
whilst respecting the Z condition and can be used as a representation. In our example, 
FOTOC’s M2 would not notice the difference between M1’s internal states related to 
turning actions, but would simply consider all the states as if they were the same in 
elaborating a class of meanings.  
The elaboration of the abstraction follows an impoverishment of AM²’s semantics. 
In elaborating a general meaning, an AM² loses the specific meanings related to the 
symbols. Thus, it appears that the evolution of the praxical process would generate a 
semantics composed of generic meanings and lacking specific ones. For an evolved 
AM², there would be only the meaning ‘turning’ and there would (or indeed could) be 
no distinction between meanings such as ‘turning left’ and ‘turning right’. To show how 
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AM²’s semantics overcomes this shortcoming more details about the praxical process 
are required. This is a fair requirement but we will delay the explanation until § 4 
because we need to concentrate our attention on a more basic issue first. The reader will 
recall that we have outlined two main problems that must be solved to overcome the 
SGP. The first one – the ability to elaborate meanings and associate meanings with 
symbols – has been solved in this section. In § 3.1-3.2 we offer a solution to the second 
problem, the one posed by the fulfilment of the Z condition. 
 
3.1 THREE CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF AM² 
There are three main elements in the process performed by an AM² that might be 
criticized for not being semantically free: the transduction process, the storing rule and 
the performing rule. We shall now show that, in each case, the process described in § 3 
satisfies the Z condition.  
One may suspect that the association between M1’s internal states and M2’s 
symbols is implemented by following some semantic criterion, yet the process 
described is purely mechanical, i.e. a simple input/output process in which, given an 
input, Sn, M2 transduces and associates it with a symbol, Symn. No semantic contents or 
interpretation rules occur at this stage. The symbols are chosen arbitrarily and the input 
Sn is elaborated by M2 only by virtue of its LoA. As we showed in § 3, LoAs are 
hardwired in relation to AM², they define the kind of perceptions that the machines have 
of the environment and they do not imply any semantic content. What we have is a 
functional process that gives an output (symbol) for any received input (description of 
internal state). Input and output are then recorded together in M2’s memory and only 
then do they become coupled together.  
Against the availability of M2’s capacity to apply the storing rule, one may 
object that recording capacities require in turn the ability to discriminate between useful 
(or relevant) and useless (or irrelevant) contents, but that this capability presupposes the 
existence of some semantic criteria that enable the agent to learn and apply some 
categorical order and to identify what should be stored and what should be discarded. 
However, M2 does not draw any distinction in applying the storing rule, as it records 
some/all of the received inputs and some/all of its outputs. Some numerical threshold 
might be implemented, but no categorical criterion is at work in defining how M2 
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applies the storing rule. The latter dictates that M2 registers the elaborations without 
any distinction. Thus, no semantic criteria are presupposed at this stage either. 
The third aspect concerns the performing rule. One may argue that, given the 
sort of transduction, association and memorization described above, the AA must also 
be supposed to learn how to use the associated symbols and internal states (what we are 
treating as their meanings) successfully (that is, correctly, accurately, relevantly, 
efficiently etc.), and hence that it is at this stage that the AA must rely on some semantic 
resources, which would be extrinsic to the AM² and therefore beg the question. Perhaps 
not initially, but in the long run the elaborations of an AM² would not satisfy the Z 
condition and the SGP would remain unsolved. For one may object that an AM² cannot 
acquire any proficiency in using the grounded symbols without violating the Z 
condition. Once in place, the performing rule may satisfy the Z condition, but its 
development in the first place actually violates that condition.  
Fortunately, the objection is mistaken since it is possible to show that AM²s can 
learn how to use their symbols successfully through their interactions with the 
environment, without presupposing any semantic resource. This is the second step, 
which we are going to see in the next section.  
 
3.2 LEARNING THE PERFORMING RULE TROUGH HEBB’S RULE AND 
LOCAL SELECTION 
To show how a population of AM²s can evolve to the point where its members can learn 
the performing rule while satisfying the Z condition we shall consider a typical learning 
rule, Hebb’s rule, first formulated in (Hebb, 1949), and draw on the resources made 
available by the method of artificial evolution. More specifically, we shall consider 
local selection (LS) algorithms, and especially ELSA (Evolutionary Local Selection 
Algorithm) developed in (Menczer et al., 2000; Menczer et al., 2001). Note that the 
scenario described in the remainder of this section represents only a general framework, 
that is, only one of the possible ways in which AM²s may be able to learn how to use 
the performing rule while respecting the Z condition. That there is such a possibility is 
all that is needed for our purposes; showing that this is the only way that is viable in 
terms of engineering, or that it is the actual way or even a biologically plausible way in 
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which agents may be able to learn the performing rule falls outside the scope of this 
paper. 
Hebb’s learning rule may be summarised in the following statement: neurons 
that fire together wire together. The rule follows from a principle formulated by Hebb: 
‘When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently 
takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or 
both cells such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased’ (Hebb 1949, 
p. 62). Hebb’s rule is considered a fundamental way in which experience changes 
behaviour in both vertebrates and invertebrates (Donahoe et al., 1997; Real, 1991).  
Hebb’s rule has been studied in biology and ethology and it is used to simulate 
learning processes with artificial neural networks. It is a general learning rule according 
to which an AA learns to couple an input and an output. The algorithms based on 
Hebb’s rule define a kind of reinforced learning. This is the most common process by 
which organisms learn from their interactions with the environment to achieve a goal. In 
such algorithms, the correlation of activity between two cells is reinforced by increasing 
the weighting between them; so the network’s weightings are set in such a way that its 
output reflects its “familiarity” with an input. The learning follows from a scalar 
reinforcement signal, which is defined according to the efficiency – established through 
the environment’s feedback – of the performed associations.  
Suppose we have a very first generation of AM²s embedded in an environment. 
They are able to perform a few actions, such as moving around in the environment. 
Since it is the very first generation, it is plausible to assume that their architecture is 
simpler than the architecture of the AM² described in § 3. Their M2s have a finite set of 
symbols, and they do not delete the symbols they have already associated with 
states/meanings. Hence a symbol used for an association could be associated more than 
once either with the same M1’s state or with different ones. Same AM²s execute, in the 
same arbitrary way, the associating process. As we know from § 3, every time M1 sends 
an internal state Sn to the M2, it is transduced at a given LoA and M2 then selects a 
symbol, say Symn, from a symbol source, associates it to Sn and stores this association 
in its memory. Before learning the performing rule, a M2 does not distinguish whether – 
and with which symbol – an incoming Sn has been already associated. Suppose that, 
after a finite number of runs, it turns out that an association between the same symbol 
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and the same internal state has been used more than the other ones. According to Hebb’s 
rule, the associations that are most used will be further privileged until they become 
stable. So that, when in the future M2 receives as input Sn, it will more readily associate 
Sn with Symn. In this way, AM²s learn to associate a symbol with a meaning in a stable 
fashion and hence to execute the performing rule. The evolution of even rudimentary 
ways of grounding their symbols and hence of managing some basic communication 
will then further privilege and reinforce the selection of such AM²s able to obtain the 
“right” symbols-states associations. Gradually, generations of more evolved AM²s will 
be able not only to perform some of the steps required to apply the performing rule, but 
also to impose a social pressure on future AM²s that grows exponentially, until new 
agents will start being selected in relation to their capacities to respond to old agents’ 
semantically-oriented behaviours. At that point, the hardwired nature of the initial 
stages in the process of symbol-grounding may even become redundant, atrophy and 
disappear. One may object that Hebb’s rule, or one like it, provides an extrinsic bias 
towards identifying the most rewarding behaviour – in our case, this is the development 
of stable transductions and associations between behaviours, internal states and symbols 
– and that therefore it breaches the Z condition. In order to answer this final objection, 
we shall refer to an evolutionary scenario simulated by running ELSA. This algorithm is 
well-known, so the reader already acquainted with it may wish to skip the following 
summary.  
ELSA is derived from a realistic scheme of the evolutionary processes. It 
follows from algorithms originally motivated by Alife models of adaptive agents placed 
in ecological environments. ELSA’s main feature is that the selection is locally 
mediated by the environment in which the AAs are situated. That is to say that the 
fitness of AAs does not follow from global interactions across the whole population and 
the environment. Rather, the fitness is defined through the interactions between a 
singular AA and the environmental niche that the AA happens to inhabit. The 
environment biases the selection by managing the energetic resources, for it associates 
an energy bonus – which constitutes the selecting parameter – to every feature that the 
AAs may develop. The energy bonus assigned to any individual solution is in 
proportion both to the degree of the fitness of the solution and to the level of energy 
available in any zone of the environment. In this way, the environment can be 
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considered as a data structure, which contains all the values assigned to each skill 
optimized by the AAs and keeps track of the actions of AAs. Two main aspects of 
ELSA need to be highlighted here.  
First, the evolutionary process is independent of any external intervention. This 
defuses the previous objection. Running ELSA, the selection process is not performed 
according to some central bottleneck or predefined parameter; rather, the population 
changes depending on its interactions with the environment. The population’s features 
are an intrinsic consequence of the environment’s characteristics. This way, ELSA may 
be used to explain the Z-compliant use of Hebb’s rule by a population of AM²s. 
Suppose that, in some niches, the energy resources are set according to some 
instantiation of Hebb’s rule. In such niches, the environment promotes those AM²s able 
to follow Hebb’s rule and hence to elaborate stable couplings of inputs and outputs. In 
so doing, the AM²s do not appeal to any supervision from the programmer or from any 
other AA that is already semantically proficient; they just adapt to whatever bias is 
present in their environment. It follows that, in learning and performing Hebb’s rule, 
they do not violate the Z condition. Moreover, since some fundamental biases are 
shared by most types of agents (think in biology of the famous three fs), it is literally 
natural that some functionally-similar types of eco-tuned AbS will evolve among 
different populations of agents.  
Second, according to ELSA, the energy bonus is shared by the AAs developing 
the same feature in the same niche. So, the competition between the AAs is about the 
finite environmental resources and it is never across the whole population, but rather 
among the AAs situated in the same environmental area. Hence, the AAs have 
“interest” not only in achieving the best features, but also in finding the least populated 
zone in the environment where more energy is available. Thus, the population quickly 
distributes itself across the ranges given by the environmental features. This way ELSA 
encourages coverage and multi-modal optimization (all good solutions are represented 
in the population) rather than standard convergence (all individuals converging on the 
best solution). ELSA guarantees the natural implementation of a heterogeneous 
population, a feature that is pivotal for the solution of the SGP in view of a realistic 
account of the variety of groundings, and hence of semantics, that might become 
available across sub-populations. 
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So far, we have provided a solution to the two problems posed at the beginning 
of § 3. Recall: an agent must be able (i) to associate symbols with the actions that it 
performs, without (ii) helping itself to any semantic resource in associating actions and 
symbols. It follows that, through the praxical approach, an AM² is able to develop some 
elementary semantic skills while respecting the Z condition. Let us now see how an 
AM² would evolve its semantic abilities from the very first stage, described here, to a 
more complex one.  
 
4. From Grounded Symbols to Grounded Communication and Abstractions 
In § 1, we outlined seven requirements that a strategy must satisfy to provide a valid 
solution for the SGP. So far, we have shown that the praxical strategy satisfies six of the 
seven requirements. In short, it allows the AM²s to ground the meanings of the symbols 
in the data following the sensori-motor interactions between the AM² and the 
environment; the development of some sort of representations and abstraction 
capacities; the use of evolution in the development of the semantic skills and respect of 
the Z condition. We have still to prove that the praxical strategy enables the AM²s to 
develop some sort of communication capacities among AAs in order to ground the 
symbols diachronically and avoid the Wittgensteinian problem of a “private language”. 
So, in the remainder of this section, we shall describe how a population of AM²s can 
develop more complex semantic abilities, such as communication and the elaboration of 
a shared lexicon, and thus satisfy the last requirement. We shall then rely on AA’s 
communication abilities to show how AM²s can overcome the problem of an 
impoverished semantics, anticipated in § 3. 
Communication represents an invaluable achievement of a population of AAs 
for which coordinated social activity and the exchange of information provides highly 
adaptive benefits and may be vital for survival. Given such advantages, one can explain 
the development of communication and of a shared lexicon in a population of AM²s as a 
result of natural selection and of the interactions among a population of AM²s and 
between AM²s and environment. We shall specify an evolutionary scenario in which 
such abilities would evolve.  
Let us assume an environment in which the evolution is still a local evolution. 
Suppose we have a heterogenic population of AM²s – made of both AM²s able to 
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elaborate only more specific meanings (SAM²) and AM²s able to elaborate only more 
general meanings (GAM²). The AM²s inhabiting a given niche interact with the 
environment in two ways: they feed and they can hide themselves to avoid the attacks of 
three kinds of predators – α, β and γ – which put them in three internal states (the reader 
will find more details about this scenario in (Grim et al., 2001)). Suppose the AM²s 
involved in this scenario engage in a kind of adaptive language game, such as the guess 
game (Steels, 2005). A guess game is a technique used to study the development of 
common language in situated AAs. This kind of game involves two AAs situated in a 
common environment. Each AA involved in the game has a role: one is the speaker, and 
names the object that it perceives; the other one is the hearer and has to find out the 
objects named by the speaker by trial and error. The speaker communicates only to 
convey the name of a perceived referent, and the hearer communicates only to inform 
the speaker about its guessing concerning the referent named by the speaker. During the 
game, the AAs interact and develop a common system of symbols. The game ends 
successfully if the two AAs develop a shared lexicon, grounded in the interaction 
among themselves and with the environment. In the case of the AM²s described above, 
the communicated symbols are related to the speaker’s internal states and, indirectly, to 
the action that it performs, for example ‘open your mouth’ or ‘hide yourself’ (using an 
observer-oriented description). Any time a symbol is communicated, the hearer 
performs one of these two actions. Since the actions are relevant to survival, the agents 
who perform the appropriate action – open their mouths and hide themselves when the 
communicated symbol indicates one of these actions – have a higher chance of 
surviving and hence reproducing than the ones which do not perform the right action. 
The agents that survive receive positive feedback from the environment, and they learn 
– through a Hebb-like rule – to associate that received symbol with the internal state 
related to the action that they perform. We can suppose that the hearer applies the 
storing rule to the received symbol. It performs a new association process, and the AM² 
stores in its memory the ensuing couple: the symbol received and its M1’s internal state 
related to the action performed once the symbol has been heard (see Figure 4). In the 
memory of the hearer’s M1 internal states are associated both with the symbol it first 
used to name those states and with the new symbols communicated by the speaker.  
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Figure 4. Symi is the incoming symbol communicated by the speaker to the hearer. Once it has received 
the symbol the hearer will record it in its memory. Symi will be recorded together with the hearer’s 
internal state and the symbol that the hearer firstly associated with that state. 
 
In this way, the symbols communicated acquire a meaning also for the hearer and can 
be used by the AM²s to develop a semantically grounded communication system. Since 
the same AM² interacts through different guess games with other AM²s, the same 
symbol can become related to the internal states of different AM²s – with different 
LoAs – among the population. Thus, the symbol communicated by the speaker ends up 
naming a set of similar states. Following this strategy, a shared lexicon can emerge 
through communications among a population of AM²s. The shared symbols emerge 
according to use, and one can conclude that the most useful and hence recurrent 
symbols will be used as names of sets of similar states.  For example, suppose a GAM² 
and a SAM² are involved in a guess game. We know the GAM² will use the same 
symbol to name all the states related to the attacks of the predators α, β and γ. Suppose a 
GAM² communicates its symbol to a SAM². In order for the game to end successfully, 
the SAM² has to associate the generic symbol with one of his states related to the 
attacks of the predators, it does not matter which. Thus, a GAM²’s symbols acquire a 
meaning also for a SAM², since they are related to its internal states as well. In this way, 
the meanings elaborated by any AM² can be communicated among the population in the 
system. The semantics elaborated following the praxical strategy does not incur the 
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problem of the private language. Generation by generation the AM²s select recurrent 
symbols until they define a set of shared symbols that they all use as names of similar 
internal states. 
Given how the AM²s develop the shared lexicon it could be objected that the 
semantics generated by the praxical strategy reproduces the Wittgensteinian semantics 
of meaning-as-use and hence that it violate the Z condition (cf. § 2). But the 
AM²s’communication abilities and the development of their shared lexicon, described in 
this section, follow from a different process and do not play any role in the process of 
semantically grounding of the symbols.  
Semantically grounded communication develops when the AM²s already use 
grounded symbols, and the SGP is solved before the AM²s start to communicate with 
each other. The system needs to be jump-started somewhere within the virtuous circle, 
and the “where” is the relation between internal states and symbols in single members 
of the population, not their communication processes. In particular, one feature helps us 
to distinguish praxical semantics from the semantics of meaning-as-use. In the 
Wittgensteinian theory, meaning arises from the communications among the agents; the 
agents play in order to reach some agreement about the meaning. In praxical semantics, 
the meaning does not arise from the communication processes, but it is already defined, 
or at least well-sketched, when the AM² starts to communicate. What is shared in the 
communication process are the grounded symbols, not the meanings. 
Consider now a last limitation of an AM²’s semantics. The elaboration of 
abstractions, described in § 3, causes an impoverishment of AM²’s semantics. In 
elaborating a general meaning, an AM² loses the specific meanings related to the 
symbols. Thus, it might be objected that the evolution of the praxical process generates 
a semantics composed of only very generic meanings, which tend to become even more 
generic. In our example, for an evolved AM², there would be only the meaning ‘turning’ 
and there would (or indeed could) be no distinction between meanings such as ‘turning 
left’ and ‘turning right’. Moreover, the same agent also runs the risk of losing even the 
meaning ‘turning’ in favour of an even more generic ‘moving’. The answer is that it is 
true that the semantics of a single AM² is bounded by the LoAs of that agent. And yet, 
this limit can be overcome when a whole population of AM²s is taken into 
consideration. For we have seen that the ability to share semantically-grounded symbols 
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to communicate among agents ensures that, through evolutionary pressure, the right (i.e. 
fit for survival) balance between generality and specificity of the semantics in question 
will be reached. In other words, it is the diachronic evolution of the population of agents 
that ensures the anchoring of otherwise possibly too-generically-grounded symbols to 
concrete usage in the real world. 
  
5. Conclusion: from Grounding to Communicating 
In this paper we have proposed a new solution for the SGP, analysing its possible 
developments and some of its limitations. The solution suggested has been called 
praxical to stress the interactions between agents and environment. The praxical 
approach is based on two main components: an Action-based Semantics (AbS) and the 
AM²s, which implement the AbS thanks to their architecture. The two components 
allow the AAs to develop semantic skills sufficient to satisfy the seven requirements 
spelled out in § 1 and hence to overcome the SGP without violating the Z condition. 
There are two points of view from which the praxical approach may be understood.  
Technically, the praxical approach provides a solution to the SGP and describes 
a plausible and implementable model of AA. The architecture of AM2 is based on the 
meta-programming paradigm, which is largely used to program AAs. And there are 
programming languages based on a framework that can already be interpreted in terms 
of AbS (Mosses, 1992).  
Philosophically, § 3.2 and § 4 show how AM²s develop more complex semantic 
skills by combining the praxical approach and artificial evolution. We saw how a 
population of AM²s could elaborate abstracted meanings and develop communications 
abilities and how they could grow a shared lexicon. This points towards a more 
ambitious and challenging perspective: the possibility of providing a theory of meaning 
based on praxical terms. 
The distinction between symbols and meaning is a crucial difference between 
the praxical solution and the approaches reviewed in our previous work (Taddeo and 
Floridi, 2005). Other attempts to solve the SGP consider meaning and symbol as two 
aspects of the same data. Thus, an AA is supposed to elaborate a set of perceptual data 
in order to obtain a representation which is both the meaning and the symbol that is then 
used to name that very representation. On the contrary, our praxical solution treats 
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meaning and symbol as two kinds of independent data: the first one is given directly 
every time an AM² interacts with the environment, whereas the second is produced by 
M2. Only at the end of the process does an AM² couple them together. This allows the 
AM²s to respect the Z condition: since there is no need for a process through which 
meaning must be elaborated, there is also no need for any extrinsic criteria required to 
guide the elaboration of meaning. Still, the semantics elaborated by the AM²s has a 
certain lack of completeness and complexity. AbS provides a minimal and simple 
semantics. It is patently not truth-functional nor does it justify the elaboration of 
meanings through some explicit agreement among the agents. We have seen that it is 
also far from being Wittgensteinian. AbS and the praxical approach more generally 
define a semantics that is simple and elementary enough to be developed autonomously 
by AAs. This is a semantics that is compatible with AAs’ features and hence, in this 
sense, it is non-anthropocentric. However, we have shown in § 4 that the complexity of 
AM²s’ semantics can be escalated through evolutionary and social processes, to the 
point when it allows the AM²s to develop communication skills and create a shared 
lexicon. 
The possibility of the evolution of language skills in a population of agents 
through social pressure has been described in (Smith et al., 1999). “When we meet a 
linguistic novelty we do not give up too easily: we try to guess the meaning by watching 
others, as well as trying it out of ourselves. […] (the meaning) must be built on pre-
existing neuronal structures”, (Smith et al., 1999, p. 165). We agree completely. Going 
back to the AM² population, and considering a generation of AM²s already provided 
with semantic skills, it turns out that further semantic elaborations are greatly facilitated 
and improved by social interactions among AM²s. So we can suppose that AM²s acquire 
the performing and storing rule through a ‘genetic assimilation learning’ (Pinker, 1994). 
Through this process, a learnt behaviour is converted (replaced) into one that is 
genetically programmed. More specifically, in a generation of AM²s, in which the 
performing and storing rules are genetically assimilated, the meaning no longer has to 
be directly related to the interactions between an AM² and the environment, but can be 
based on interactions with other AM²s.  
We believe that the solution of the SGP offered in this paper provides the seeds 
for an interesting explanation of how advanced semantic and linguistic skills develop 
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among biological agents in natural environments. Yet these implications of the praxical 
approach have been only briefly sketched here, for they are left for a further and last 
stage in our research. 
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Notes 
 
1 In the same sense in which “praxis” is used to refer to “theory in practice”, we use 
“praxical” to qualify interactions that are information- or knowledge-oriented. An 
embodied and embedded agent has a praxical relation with its surroundings when it 
learns about, and operates on, its environment in ways that are conducive to the 
acquisition of implicit information or knowledge about it. In human agents, practical 
experience is non-theoretical, whereas praxical experience is pre- but also pro-
theoretical, as it conduces to theory. 
2 For a robot with similar skills to FOTOC’s see Lego Wall  Follower. It is equipped with 
a turret, enabling the rotation of its sensor (in the right direction) when a wall is 
detected, see http://www.techeblog.com/index.php/tech-gadget/lego-roverbot for a more 
detailed description. 
3 The diurnal motion (being these of flowers or of leaves) is a response to the direction 
of the sun, performed by motor cells in flexible segments of the plant specialized in 
pumping potassium ions into nearby tissues (thus changing the turgor pressure) 
reversibly. 
4 In the Theory of Level of Abstraction (LoA) discrete mathematics is used to specify 
and analyse the behaviour of information systems. The definition of a LoA is: given a 
well-defined set X of values, an observable of type X is a variable whose value ranges 
over X. A LoA consists of a collection of observables of given types. The LoA is 
determined by the way in which one chooses to describe, analyse and discuss a system 
and its context. A LoA consists of a collection of observables, each with a well-defined 
possible set of values or outcomes. Each LoA makes possible an analysis of the system, 
the result of which is called a model of the system. Evidently, a system may be 
described at a range of LoAs and so can have a range of models. More intuitively, a 
LoA is comparable to an ‘interface’, which consists of a set of features, the observables. 
5 Even if LoAs are not yet directly involved in the emergence of the elementary abilities 
required to overcome the SGP, a clear analysis of an agent’s LoAs is crucial in order to 
understand the development of advanced semantic abilities. Hence, it is important to 
introduce an explicit reference to them at this early stage in the description of the 
architecture of an AM². 
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6 Bacteria interact with the external environment, sending and receiving signals. The 
transmission of the signal is possible thanks to some receptors – glicoproteins – on the 
membrane. Such receptors interact with the signal’s molecules, ligandi. The interaction 
determines a change that determines a new behaviour of the bacteria. 
